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Roberson: South Carolina's Inevitable Adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure

SOUTH CAROLINA'S INEVITABLE ADOPTION OF
THE INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE:

BALANCING PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS
WITH FREEDOM OF EMPLOYMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Tomorrow's newspaper headline could read, "ABC Company Obtains
Court Order Preventing Former Employee from Working for XYZ Company."
Such a scenario is possible with the doctrine of inevitable disclosure under
South Carolina's trade secret laws, even in the absence of a non-compete
agreement or other restrictive covenant.' Under the inevitable disclosure
doctrine, "a former employee may be restricted in post-employment activities
where it is found that he or she will 'inevitably disclose' the trade secrets of the
former employer in the new position." Companies constantly fear that their
employees will take valuable trade secrets to the competition. However,
unbeknownst to many, the South Carolina Trade Secrets Act of 19972 (Trade
Secrets Act) may be used to prevent those employees from working for a
competitor even in limited circumstances.3 Under the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure, this restriction may be possible even in the absence of a restrictive
covenant.4 While many jurisdictions with trade secret statutes similar to South
Carolina's have adopted inevitable disclosure, South Carolina courts have yet
to publish a decision deciding how injunctive relief for actual or threatened
misappropriation should be provided under the Trade Secrets Act.
States that statutorily permit actual or threatened misappropriation to be
enjoined are allowing employers to prevent employees from working for
competitors in limited circumstances. 5 This Comment examines the issues
South Carolina courts should address when an employer-plaintiff attempts to
stop, or temporarily delay, a former employee with knowledge of the
company's trade secrets from working for a competitor. Specifically, this
Comment advocates the adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine in South
Carolina in limited situations. Part II begins with a summary of trade secret
law, including a discussion of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act adopted by
various states; provides an overview of the inevitable disclosure doctrine; and
1. See infra note 11.
2. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-8-10 to -130 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999).
3. See infra Part III.A.2.h.
4. Stephen L. Sheinfeld & Jennifer M. Chow, ProtectingEmployer Secrets and the
"Doctrineof InevitableDisclosure," 581 Practicing L. Inst. Litig. Handbook 367,405 (1998).
5. See generallyinfra notes 35-3 8 and accompanying text (listing cases from various states
enjoining threatened misappropriation by preventing former employees from accepting
employment with competitors).
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gives a brief history of South Carolina's approach to trade secret protection.
Part III argues that South Carolina should adopt the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure and make injunctive relief available to employers with trade secrets.
After discussing the approach used by various states, this Comment advocates
an objective test for deciding when to invoke the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure based upon an analysis of other jurisdictions' approaches.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Trade Secrets andTheir Protection
The Trade Secrets Act broadly defines trade secrets as follows:
(a) information including, but not limited to, a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique,
product, system, or process, design, prototype, procedure, or
code that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by the public or any
other person who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
(b) A trade secret may consist of a simple fact, item, or
procedure, or a series or sequence of items or procedures
which, although individually could be perceived as relatively
minor or simple, collectively can make a substantial
difference in the efficiency of a process or the production of
a product, or may be the basis of a marketing or commercial
strategy. The collective effect of the items and procedures
must be considered in any analysis of whether a trade secret
exists and not the general knowledge of each individual item
or procedure.6
To maintain a competitive edge, a company must protect its secrets.7
Facility security systems, password protections on computer systems, limited
advertisements or public disclosures, and employee and vendor confidentiality

6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-20(5) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999); cf UNiF. TRADE
SECRETsAcr § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14U.L.A. 438 (1990) [hereinafter UNIFORM Acr] (defining
trade secrets very similarly except with fewer categories than part (a) above and not including
any of part (b)).
7. See Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 501, 505 (Ga. 1998) (enjoining
former employee ofplaintiff and stating "it had taken [plaintiff) millions of dollars and years of
testing and modifications to develop as part of [plaintiffs] plan to acquire a competitive edge
over other cable and wire companies such as [defendant company].").
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agreements are common means of protection." As many trade secrets simply
include information that must be conveyed and used by employees, the security
of those trade secrets is jeopardized when those employees leave to work in a
similar capacity for a competitor of their former company. In the absence of an
enforceable non-disclosure or non-compete agreement with the departing
employees, an employer may be forced to resort to the injunctive relief
provided in the Trade Secrets Act.9
B. Overview of the Doctrineof InevitableDisclosure
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure is a legal approach courts use when
deciding if and how to prevent a former employee with knowledge of an
employer's trade secrets from working for a competitor in a capacity where the
employee would inevitably disclose those trade secrets." Inevitable disclosure
can be used by courts even in the absence ofrestrictive covenant such as nondisclosure agreements or non-compete agreements." An employer who
successfully invokes the inevitable disclosure doctrine may enjoin a former
employee from working for a competitor, as if under a non-compete

8. See generallyAllis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp.
645, 650 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (listing means plaintiffused to protect trade secrets); UNIFORM ACT
§ I cmt., 14 U.L.A. 439 (1990) ("The efforts required to maintain secrecy are those 'reasonable
under the circumstances.' The courts do not require that extreme and unduly expensive
procedures be taken to protect trade secrets against flagrant industrial espionage.").
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-50(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999). A non-disclosure
agreement is a contract entered into by an employer and employee prior to or during employment
in which the employee promises not to reveal the employer's trade secrets if and when the
employee leaves the company. A non-compete agreement is a similar contract but where the
employee promises not to work for a competitor in a capacity where the trade secret would be
revealed. See, e.g., Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 338 S.C. 271,274, 525 S.E.2d 898, 899
(Ct. App. 1999) (stating that "a covenant not to compete must be supported by valuable
consideration" and when an "at-will employment relationship already exists without a covenant
not to compete, any future covenant must be based upon new consideration"); see also infra
notes 150-53 for a discussion on the effect of an employer failing to seek a non-compete
agreement.
10. See Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1457 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (granting an
injunction "based on a theory of 'inevitable disclosure' [whereby] 'a plaintiffmay prove a claim
of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that defendant's new employment will
inevitably lead him to rely on plaintiff's trade secrets."' (quoting PepsiCo., Inc. v. Redmond, 54
F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995)).
11. See Merck & Co., 941 F. Supp. at 1461 (enjoining employment for one year even
though "plaintiffs did not seek a non-competition agreement from [the defendant]"); T-N-T
Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 24 (Tex. App. 1998)
(enjoining disclosure of trade secrets even though defendant employees "were not required to
sign any agreement not to compete or confidentiality agreement").
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agreement," or the employer may impose a duty on that employee not to reveal
the trade secrets, as in a non-disclosure agreement.' 3
Although no consistent protocol exists for applying the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure, the jurisdictions that have adopted the doctrine have
considered similar factors when reaching their decisions.' 4 All jurisdictions
require the employer to prove the existence of a trade secret and that the
employee possessed the trade secret in some manner. 5 The employer-plaintiff
must also show that it is in direct competition with the new employer."
Jurisdictions have disagreed on the required proof necessary to show a
"threatened" misappropriation of the trade secret, 7 which often affects a
decision concerning whether and how to enjoin the employee. Because this last
requirement of proof is often a fact-based determination, decisions among
jurisdictions vary dramatically. 8
C. History of South Carolina'sTrade Secret Laws
The modem view of trade secret protection in South Carolina was
established in 1972 by the state supreme court inLowndes Products,Inc. v.
Brower.9 The Lowndes court adopted the original definition of trade secrets
from the Restatement of Torts and also listed factors to be used to determine
whether a trade secret was adequately protected."

12. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D.
Mich. 1966) (granting preliminary injunction of employee from working for competitor in any
capacity pertaining to distributor type fuel injection systems for jet engines); Essex Group, Inc.
v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1998) (enjoining employee knowledgeable of former
employer's computer software trade secrets from working for direct competitor for five years).
13. See Thomas v. Alloy Fasteners, Inc., 664 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(granting injunction to stop an employee from using his former employer's customer lists at his
new position but permitting the employee to contact the customers by techniques common to the
industry); T-N-TMotorsports,Inc., 965 S.W.2d at 18 (allowing employee to work for a direct
competitor but preventing him from using former employer's trade secret information regarding
modifications to high-end sports cars).
14. See generallyPart II.A.2 (discussing approaches used by different states).
15. See infra notes 35-38 (listing cases from various states which address trade secret
misappropriation). Courts focus on the employee's ability to convey a trade secret, either through
tangible means, such as photocopies or copied files, or through intangible means such as
memory.
16. See infra notes 35-38.
17. See infra notes 35-38.
18. See infra notes 35-38.
19. 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (1972) (declining to grant injunctive relief because

former employer had not used reasonable precautions to protect the trade secrets, but pennitting
plaintiff to recover damages for wrongful acts of employees).
20. Id. at 327, 191 S.E.2d at 764 (citing RESTATEmENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) and
considering whether employer required restrictive covenant, warned employees of secrecy,
reminded terminated employee ofsecrecy, or implemented adequate security measures); seealso
Wilkes v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135,1140 (D.S.C. 1974) (expanding the standard
definition of trade secret by adding "the fact that part, or even eventually all, of the components
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss4/7
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The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) was promulgated in 197921 but
was not adopted by South Carolina until 1992 (SCTSA). The 1996 South
Carolina Court of Appeals decision of CarolinaChemicalEquipment Co. v.
Muckenfuss' held a broad non-disclosure agreement was invalid based upon
the standards ofa non-compete agreement.A In partial response to this decision,
the legislature enacted the Trade Secrets Act the following year' To date, no
published South Carolina court decision has considered an injunction for
threatened misappropriation of trade secrets. The lack of litigation may be the
result ofemployers' uncertainty over whether the courts will provide injunctive
relief, and, if they do, to what extent.' Since employee departure and loss of
trade secrets can occur very quickly, businesses may try to reach a quick
agreement with the employee rather than begin protracted litigation and
possibly lose the trade secrets during the interim. Therefore, the courts and the
parties must be prepared to quickly address a claim for preliminary injunctive
relief when the issue arises.

of a trade secret are matters of public law or public knowledge does not prohibit a claim of trade
secret" and adding "misappropriation" as an element of a trade secret claim).
21. UNIFORM AcT, 14 U.L.A. 433.
22. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-8-1 to -11 (Law. Co-op. 1976 &Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997).
23. 322 S.C. 289,471 S.E.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1996) (overturning five-year injunction against
employees prohibiting them from selling certain products within Charleston County).
24. Id. at 294, 471 S.E.2d at 723 (holding contract defined trade secrets so broadly that
virtually all information employee acquired during employment would fall within its definition);
see generally Cherie W. Blackburn, Covenants Not To Compete and Other Restrictive
Covenants, S.C. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L., June 25, 1999, at 21 (discussing South Carolina's
"Blue Pencil Rule [which] allows a court to 'blue pencil,' or mark through, the invalid portions
ofa restrictive covenant and enforce the remaining valid provisions of the covenant"). Blackburn
further notes:
The South Carolina courts have made [it] clear [that] its application is
limited and will only be used by the court where it is clear that the parties
intended the covenant to be divisible or severable. It is also clear that South
Carolina courts will not create a new agreement for the parties that they did
not voluntarily enter.
Id. The inevitable disclosure doctrine would not circumvent this policy as it imposes injunctive
relief and not a court-imposed agreement. Id.
25. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 39-8-10 to -130 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999) (effective May
21,1997). Thenewprovision ofS.C.CODEANN. § 39-8-30(D) (Law. Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1999)
effectively overturns CarolinaChemicalEquipmentCo. v. Muckenfuss, 322 S.C. 289,471 S.E.2d
721 (Ct. App. 1996) by stating "[a] contractual duty not to disclose or divulge a trade secret, to
maintain the secrecy of a trade secret, or to limit the use of a trade secret must not be considered
void or unenforceable or against public policy for lack of a durational or geographical
limitation." Id.
26. See generallyDavid P. Hathaway, Is the North CarolinaTradeSecrets ProtectionAct
Itselfa Secret, andIs the Act Worth Protecting?,77 N.C. L. REV. 2151,2210-14 (1999) (listing
reasons trade secret statutes are "seldom the subject of published law").
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D. Availability oflnjunctive Relief in South Carolina
As in every state, injunctive relief is available in South Carolina." In order
to prevail in a request for an injunction, the plaintiff must prove two essential
conditions:
First, the complaint must allege facts which appear to be
sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction; and,
second, on the entire showing from both sides it must appear,
in view of all the circumstances, that the injunction is
reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff
pending the litigation.'
The provision of the Trade Secrets Act for enjoining "actual or threatened
misappropriation" does not specify what elements a plaintiff must prove for
an injunction to be granted. It can be implied that the legislature left the
requirements to the judiciary. Many jurisdictions that apply the inevitable
disclosure doctrine look to the preliminary injunction standards ofDataphase
Systems, Inc. v. CL Systems, Inc.3"
III. ANALYSIS
A. South CarolinaShouldAdopt the Doctrine oflnevitable Disclosure
1. GrowingPopularityof the Inevitable DisclosureDoctrine
Forty-one states and the District of Columbia 3 have provisions for
enjoining threatened misappropriation that are virtually identical to South
Carolina's Trade Secrets Act.32 The UTSA, or some variation of it, adopted by

27. See Childs v. City of Columbia, 87 S.C. 566, 567, 70 S.E. 296, 297 (1911) (listing
South Carolina cases involving injunctive relief).
28. Knohl v. Duke Power Co., 260 S.C. 374, 376, 196 S.E.2d 115, 116 (1973) (quoting
Childs v. City of Columbia, 87 S.C. 566, 567,70 S.E. 296, 297 (1911)).
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-50(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999).
30. 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) ("Whether a preliminary injunction should issue
involves consideration of(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of the
balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties
litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest.").
31. D.C. CODEANN. § 48-502(a) (1981).
32. The states with similar statutes are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colrodao, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Lousiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraksa, Nevada, NewHampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and
West Virginia. See ALA. CODE § 8-27-4(l)(a) (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.910(a) (Michic
1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-402(A) (1994); ARK. CODEAANN. § 4-75-604(a) (1996); CAL. Civ.
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these states allows injunctive relief for threatened misappropriation of trade
secrets.33 South Carolina's 1997 Trade Secrets Act, while repealing the
SCTSA, kept the injunctive relief provision in its entirety.34
Fifteen of the states adopting the UTSA have applied, in some fashion, the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure in published decisions." California has

CODE § 3426.2(a) (West 1997); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-74-103 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3552(a) (1997); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 6, § 2002(a) (1999); FLA. STAT. ch. 39.688.003(1) (1990); GA.
CODE ANN. § 10-1-762(a) (2000); HAw. REV. STAT. § 482B-3(a) (1998); IDAHO CODE § 48802(1) (1997); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/3(a) (1993); IND. CODE§ 24-2-3-3(a) (Michie 1996);
IOWACODE § 550.3(1) (1997); KAN. CIV.PROC. CODEANN. § 60-3321(a) (WestSupp. 2000); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 365.882(1) (Michie 1996); LA.REV. STAT.ANN. § 51:1432(A) (West 1987);
ME.REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 10, § 1543(1) (West 1997); MD. CODEANN., [COM.LAw I] § 11-1202(a)
(2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.1903(1) (Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. § 325C.02(a) (1995);
Miss. CODEANN. § 75-26-5(1) (2000); MO.REV. STAT. § 417.455(1) (Supp. 2000); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 30-14-403(1) (1999); NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-503(1) (1999); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 600A.040(1) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-B:2(I) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3A3(A) (West 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-154(a) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-25.1-02(1)
(1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.62(A) (Anderson Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78,
§ 87(A) (1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 646.463(1) (1988); RI. GEN. LAWS § 6-41-2(a) (1992); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 37-29-2(a) (Michie 2000); UTAH CODEANN. § 13-24-3(1) (1999); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 4602(a) (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-337(A) (Michie 1998); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 19.108.020(1) (1999); W. VA. CODE § 47-22-2(a) (1998).
33. UNIFORM Acr § 2(a), 14 U.L.A. 449 (1990).
34. CompareS.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-2 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997)
with S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999) (adding only a description of
reasonable time period for an injunction in (A)).
35. These states include: Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Utah, and Washington. For
the cases in these states, see CardinalFreightCarriers,Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 987
S.W.2d 642 (Ark. 1999) (preventing plaintiff's former employees from working for one year
with four particular customers desired by their new employer in the transport industry); Aetna
Ret. Se'vs., Inc. v. Hug, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1781 (June 18, 1997) (modifying a noncompete agreement to prohibit employee from working in a particular position with former
employer's competitor, but requiring former employer to compensate the employee during the
term); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch.
1964) (granting preliminary injunction against employee knowledgeable of chemical process
trade secrets from working for direct competitor); Am. TotalisatorSys., Inc. v. Automatic
Totalistors (U.S.A.) Ltd., No. CIV.A.5562, 1978 Del. CA. LEXIS 529 (Apr. 20, 1978) (granting
preliminary injunction against computer systems analyst knowledgeable of plaintiffs trade
secrets from working for competitor); Thomas v. Alloy Fasteners,Inc., 664 So. 2d 59 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) (granting injunction to stop an employee from using his former employer's
customer lists at his new position but permitting the employee to contact the customers by
techniques common in the industry); Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 501 (Ga.
1998) (enjoining employee knowledgeable of former employer's computer software trade
secrets, in the absence of any restrictive covenant, from working for direct competitor for five
years); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995) (preventing former manager
knowledgeable ofplaintiff's marketing strategy of sports drinks from working for competitor for
six months or disclosing trade secrets indefinitely); Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications
Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. 111.1989) (declining to enjoin former employees because plaintiff
could not prove telecommunication information was a trade secret); Ackerman v. KimballInt.,
Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. 1995) (enjoining employee from working for former employer's
competitors in veneer manufacturing for two years); APAC Teleservices,Inc. v. McRae, 985 F.
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expressly rejected the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.36 A Virginia court
stated that it does not recognize inevitable disclosure, although its statute
allows enjoining of threatened misappropriation.37 Of the eight states without
statutory provisions for enjoining threatened misappropriation, six states have
utilized some form the doctrine of inevitable disclosure." Whether these

Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (denying plaintiff's request to enjoin former employee from
working with a competing outsource telemarketer, yet enforcing non-disclosure agreement);
Uncle B's Bakery, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (enjoining employee
fromworking for any competing bagel manufacturer until trial completed);Allis-ChalmersMfg.
Co. v. Cont lAviation &Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (granting preliminary
injunction of employee from working for competitor in any capacity pertaining to distributor
type fuel injection systems forjet engines); Superior ConsultantCo. v. Bailey,2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13051 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2000) (enjoining consultant ofhealth care computer systems
from working for a particular competitor of his former employer); LEXIS-NEXIS v. Beer, 41 F.
Supp. 2d 950 (D. Minn. 1999) (modifying unenforceable non-compete agreement so that it
would be enforceable for one year while finding plaintiffcould not prove the existence of trade
secrets or inevitable disclosure of that information); CarbolineCo. v. Lebeck, 990 F. Supp. 762
(E.D. Mo. 1997) (denying injunctive relief to plaintiffs because they failed to prove information
consisted of trade secrets); Baxter Int., Inc. v. Morris,976 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1992) (declining
to enjoin employee from working for a competitor of former employer, but granting one year
injunction to prevent disclosure of trade secrets); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443
(M.D.N.C. 1996) (enjoining employee knowledgeable of trade secrets relating to stomach acid
antagonist from working for competitor on a particular product line for one year); B.F. Goodrich
Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (enjoining employee knowledgeable
of space-suit technology from disclosing trade secrets to a competitor of former employer);
Proctor& Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4475 (Sept. 29,2000) (overruling
denial of injunctive relief against former employee from working for competing hair care
products manufacturers); NovellInc. v. TimpanogosResearchGroupInc., 46U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1197 (Utah 1998) (enjoining employee possessing trade secrets relating to computer software
development from working for any competitor in the industry of his former employer for nine
months); Solutec Corp. v. Agnew, 88 Wash. App. 1067 (1997) (preventing employees from
competing against their former employer in the manufacture of edible apple wax containing a
certain ingredient for six years).
36. See Dajaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1638 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (denying
plaintiff's motion for sumnmary judgment on claim of misappropriation of trade secrets); Bayer
Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (declining to enjoin
former employee but granting plaintiff periodic discovery of new employer to ensure trade
secrets not misappropriated); Computer Sci. Corp. v. Computer Assoc. Int'l Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21803 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 1999) (granting defendants' motion for summaryjudgment);
Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3526 (Cal. Apr. 12,2000) (reversing and
depublishing appellate court opinion recognizing the doctrine of inevitable disclosure).
37. Gov't Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Intellisys Tech. Corp., 51 Va. Cir. 55 (1999) (declining to
enjoin threatened misappropriation but stating "employee's actions are clearly actionable as a
breach of fiduciary duty"); see supra note 32. But see Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting &
Packaging, Inc., 397 S.E.2d 110 (Va. 1990) (enjoining former employee from using trade secret
when a non-disclosure agreement existed).
38. Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin have all
utilized some form of the doctrine. For cases in these states, see Marcam Corp.v. Orchard,885
F. Supp. 294 (D. Mass. 1995) (granting one-year injunction against employee knowledgeable
of computer software trade secrets to prevent him from working for his former employer's
competitor in any capacity, as stated in his non-compete agreement); Nat ' Starch & Chem.
Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (granting
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jurisidictions use common law or statutory support for injunctive relief when
crafting a remedy, the courts apply policy reasons substantially similar to the
comments to the UTSA.39 Only Tennessee and Wyoming are without statutory
provisions for enjoining misappropriation of trade secrets or case law

recognizing the doctrine of inevitable disclosure. In summary, ofthe fifty other
jurisdictions, forty-two have adopted the threatened misappropriation language
of the UTSA, fifteen have applied the inevitable disclosure doctrine with the
UTSA, eight have used inevitable disclosure without the UTSA, two have
expressly declined to adopt the doctrine, and twenty-five have yet to publish
a decision pertaining to inevitable disclosure.
2. Application of the Doctrineoflnevitable Disclosure
a. Illinois
The leading case articulating the inevitable disclosure doctrine is PepsiCo
Inc. v. Rednond;o however, the rationale underpinning the doctrine had existed
for decades." In PepsiCo, defendant Redmond had been a PepsiCo general

preliminary injunction against employee to prevent him from working for a competitor in any
capacity dealing with envelope adhesives); Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (preventing employee knowledgeable of trade secrets relating to exercise
equipment from working for a competitor of former employer); Bus. IntelligenceServs., Inc. v.
Hudson, 580 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (upholding one year non-compete restriction to
prevent employee from working for any competitor in which she would reveal computer
software information); DoubleClicklnc.v. Henderson, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 577 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Nov. 5,1997) (enjoining employees knowledgeable ofinternet advertising trade secrets from
working for any competitor for six months); Air Prods.& Chems. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114
(Pa. Super. CL 1982) (preventing employee from working with on-site delivery of gas for a
competitor for two years to protect his former employer's trade secrets); T-N-TMotorsports,Inc.
v. Hennaey Motorsports,Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App. 1998) (allowing employee to work
for a directoompetitorbutpreventing him from using former employer's trade secret information
regarding modifications to high-end sports cars); Union CarbideCorp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d
1186 (5th Cir. 1984) (enjoining employee from disclosing any of his former employer's trade
secrets in the industrial gas industry to any competitor); La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, 938 F.
Supp. 523 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (granting preliminary injunction of up to one year preventing
former employer's marketing manager from working for any competitor).
39. UNIFoRM ACT § 2(a) comments, 14 U.L.A. 449 (amended 1985) ("[T]his Act adopts
the position of the trend of authority limiting the duration of injunctive relief to the extent of the
temporal advantage over good faith competitors gained by a misappropriator.").
40. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
41. See Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1984); Bus.
Intelligence Servs., Inc. v. Hudson, 580 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966); Am. Totalisator
Sys., Inc. v. Automatic Totalistors (U.S.A.) No. Civ.A.5562,1978 Del. Ch. LEXIS 529 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 20, 1978); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428
(Del. Ch. 1964); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prods., 179 N.Y.S. 325, 330 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1919) (upholding non-compete agreement because employee "would almost necessarily
impart [the trade secrets] to some degree;" therefore, the employee was prohibited from working
for competitor in the film industry); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct.
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manager with access to high-level business plans and marketing strategies.42
After Redmond began working for a direct competitor, PepsiCo brought suit
seeking to enjoin him from serving in any capacity similar to his former
position at PepsiCo." For reasons independent of Redmond's agreement not
to disclose PepsiCo's trade secrets, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district
court's injunction, stating, "PepsiCo finds itself in the position of a coach, one
of whose players has left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing team before
the big game." In upholding the injunction, the court analyzed the following
five factors: (1) the existence and nature of the trade secrets;45 (2) employee
exposure to those trade secrets;' (3) direct competition between the present and
former employers;47 (4) functional equivalency of the new position as
compared to the old position; 4 and (5) lack of candor and a willingness to
misuse trade secrets by the employee and new employer.49
Numerous courts have attempted to articulate and apply these PepsiCo
factors.5" The actual test to be applied in a given case varies in some respects.
Even if the test were known, it is a factor analysis, which by its nature implies
some degree of discretion to the sitting judge. Therefore, practitioners find it
difficult to advise a client on the probable outcome. However, the employerplaintiff must satisfy the requirements for injunctive relief.5 ' The jurisdictions
are simply not consistent as to what facts are relevant and most probative in the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure.

App. 1963).
42. PepsiCo,54 F.3d at 1264.
43. Id. at 1269.
44. Id. at 1270. Redmond was not accused of stealing any tangible items; he simply had
extensive and intimate knowledge of PepsiCo's marketing strategy and pricing architecture. Id.
45. Id. at 1265-66.
46. Id. at 1265.
47. Id. at 1266.
48. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1266.
49. Id. at 1270-71. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did place less emphasis on
Redmond's evasiveness with PepsiCo and the competitor's recruitment of PepsiCo employees,
but found the district court conclusion on these issues was not an abuse of discretion.
50. See Maxxim Med., Inc. v. Michelson, 51 F. Supp. 2d 773, 786 (S.D. Tex. 1999)
(quoting D. Peter Harvey, 'Inevitable' Trade Secret Misappropriationafter PepsiCo, Inc. v.
Redmond, 537 PL/PAT 199, 226[-229] (1998)); APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F.
Supp. 852,860-63 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443,1460 (M.D. N.C.
1996). These factors include: "(1) Is the new employer a competitor?; (2) What is the scope of
the defendant's new job?; (3) Has the employee been less than candid about his new position?;
(4) Has plaintiff clearly identified the trade secrets which are at risk?; (5) Has actual trade secret
misappropriation already occurred?; (6) Did the employee sign a non-disclosure and/or noncompetition agreement?; (7) Does the new employer have a policy against use of other's trade
secrets?; (8) Is it possible to 'sanitize' the employee's new position?"
51. See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 198 1); LEXISNEXIS v. Beer, 41 F. Supp. 2d 950, 956 (D. Minn. 1999).
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b. Michigan
In the 1966 case of Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Continental
Aviation & Engineering Corp.,52 the Michigan court prevented an engineer
from working for his previous employer's competitor because he could not
perform to the best of his abilities without disclosing Allis-Chalmers's trade
secrets.5 ' The court discussed many of the same policy considerations
addressed by courts that later adopted the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 4 In
finding "an inference that there is an inevitable and imminent danger of
disclosure of Allis-Chalmers trade secrets," the court simply considered (1)
whether trade secrets existed, (2) whether the former employee knew of the
trade secrets, and (3) whether the trade secrets were of "the nature of the type
of work" in the new position.5s The test does not emphasize the parties' actions
during the change of employment, but objectively decides whether the trade
secret would be disclosed.56 While granting a preliminary injunction which
allowed the former employee to work for the competitor only in positions not
involving plaintiff's trade secrets, the court balanced the protection of the
plaintiff's valuable trade secrets with the former employee's "right to migrate
from one job to another."'
c. New York
New York recognizes the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, but cautions
that "the doctrine should be applied in only the rarest of cases."58 InEarthweb
v. Schlack, the Southern District of New York decided not to enjoin the
employee, listing the following three "[flactors to consider in weighing the
appropriateness of granting injunctive relief": (1) whether the employers were
direct competitors; (2) whether the similarity between the former job and the
new job precluded the employee from "fulfill[ing] his new job responsibilities
without utilizing the trade secrets;" and (3) the value of the trade secrets to both

52. 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
53. Id. at 654 (enjoining former employee only from positions with defendant employer
which involved the design and development of distributor type fuel injection pumps).
54. Id. at 652-54.
55. Id. at 654.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Earthweb v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying preliminary
injunction because plaintiff could not prove inevitable risk of disclosure because the former
employee did not possess plaintiff's trade secrets nor did his new position require use of such
trade secrets). The court stated that "in its purest form, the inevitable disclosure doctrine treads
an exceedingly narrow path through judicially disfavored territory" of binding employees to
implied-in-fact restrictive covenants. Id.
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employers5 9 The court also indicated that "[o]ther case-specific factors such as
the nature of the industry and trade secrets should be considered as well."'
d. Texas
Texas provides injunctive relief when a former employer can prove (1) the
employee possesses trade secrets of the former employer and (2) the employee
is "in a position to use [them] to compete directly with [the former
employer]." 61 In T-N-T Motorsports, the Texas Court of Appeals did not
prevent the employee from working for the competitor, but simply precluded
the use
of the former employer's trade secrets in the customization of sports
62
cars.

e.

Georgia

In Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co.63 the Georgia Supreme Court
enjoined an employee from working in a particular department of his former
employer's competitor for five years.' In upholding the injunction the court
focused on three factors: (1) the existence of a trade secret, (2) direct
competition between the employers and the benefit the new employer would
receive from the trade secret, and (3) the employee's knowledge of the trade
secret. 6 The court did not analyze the parties' activities beyond the "reasonable
efforts [ofthe former employer] to maintain the secrecy of its [trade secrets]."'
The unusually long duration of the injunction, particularly without a noncompete or non-disclosure agreement, was justified by the new employer's
ability to overcome the injunction upon the discovery of the trade secret
through independent means.67

59. Id.
60. Id.; see also DoubleClick Inc. v. Henderson, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 577, *22-*24
(N.Y. Sup. CLNov. 5,1997) (considering the"speed withwhichthe Internet advertising industry
apparently changes" when enjoining former employees from working for companies that provide
"any advice or information concerning any aspect of advertising on the Internet").
61. T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18,24 (Tex. App.

1998).
62. Id. at 25. The plaintiff's trade secrets consisted of information about specifications for
upgrades to Dodge Viper and Mitsubishi 3000 GT motor vehicles, lists of customers, and
vendors for customized parts. Id. at 23.
63. 501 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1998).
64. Id. at 502. The former employer's logistical system took over three years to develop,
cost over $2 million, and provided substantial efficiencies in the cable and wire industry. The
former employee headed the project team for the former employer and intended to do the same
for his new employer. Therefore, the court prohibited him from working in only the logistics
department of his new employer. Id.
65. Id. at 502-05.
66. Id. at 505.
67. Id. at 506.
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North Carolina

North Carolina recognized the doctrine of inevitable disclosure in 1996.68
In deciding to enjoin the employee from working for the new employer on a
particular product line, the federal court in Merck recited the factors listed in
Travenol Laboratories Inc. v. Turnerfi to consider when ruling on a
preliminary injunction: "(1) the circumstances surrounding the termination of
employment, (2) the importance of the employee's job or position, (3) the type
of work performed by the employee, and (4) the kind of information sought to
be protected and the value of the information or the need of the competitor for
it."7 The Merck court also looked at other court decisions, such as PepsiCo,7'
and then applied the following factors: (1) whether the employee has "similar
responsibilities" in her position with the direct competitor; (2) "the
circumstances surrounding the termination to see where the equities lie;" and
(3) "the value of the information to [the new employer] and their ability to
produce it either generally or specifically."72
g. California
California has repeatedly rejected the doctrine of inevitable disclosure
because it has a policy of preventing restraint on employment.73 Recently, a
California District Court of Appeals recognized the inevitable disclosure
doctrine, 4 but the California Supreme Court ordered the opinion depublished
and reversed the decision without opinion.75
California courts use the following statutory language to reject inevitable
disclosure: "Every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in7a6
lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.
California courts use the 1941 statute, even though the legislature passed the

68. Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1457 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (enjoining former
employee of plaintiff for one year and two years, concurrently, from working with direct
competitor on a certain line ofstomach acid antagonists; the time periods were for different types
of information and the duration governed by how long the information would have competitive
value).
69. 228 S.E.2d 478,483 (N.C. CL App. 1976) (declining to enjoin employee from working
for competitor of former employer, yet prohibiting him from revealing trade secrets regarding
centrifuges made by former employer).
70. Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1459-60.
71. Id. at 1460.
72. Id. at 1460-61.
73. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1990); see also supra note 36.
74. Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680, 684 (Ct. App. 1999); see
also Richard L. Stone, Enjoining Employment Witout Evidence of Trade Secret
Misappropriation: CaliforniaAdopts the "Inevitable Disclosure" Doctrine, 4 CYBERSPACE
LAW., No. 11, Feb. 2000, at 9-12.
75. Electro Optical Indus., Inc. v. White, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3526 (Cal. Apr. 12, 2000).
76. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1990).
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UTSA in 1985 which provided injunctive relief for threatened
misappropriation.' The courts have reconciled this conflict of statutory policy
by "assum[ing] that the Legislature ha[d] existing laws in mind at the time that
it enact[ed] a new statute."'8
h. South Carolina
South Carolina does not have a statutory equivalent to California's
prohibition of restraints on professions, trade, or business.79 The absence of
such a statute indicates that a South Carolina court is more likely to apply the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure when faced with an appropriate case, assuming
the legislature does not enact a statute in conflict with the inevitable disclosure
doctrine. 0
One of the most difficult components of the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure is deciding the type of remedy to grant. The injunctive relief the
doctrine provides varies greatly. The injunctions can last for a few months,
until trial,8" or for many years. 2 Some of the more common factors used to
determine the type of injunctive relief to award are the jurisdiction's
willingness to resti-ain an employee from subsequent employment with a
particular competitor, 83 the type oftrade secret and the particular industry," the
existence of restrictive covenants, 8s or suspicious actions by the employee.8 6

77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West 1997).
78. Schmidt v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 14 Cal. App. 4th 23, 27 (1993) (stating
California's "time-honored rules of statutory construction").
79. See supranote 73.
80. See generally Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting & Packaging, Inc., 397 S.E.2d
110, 114 (Va. 1990) (stating Virginia's policy that ".it is the responsibility of the legislature, not
the judiciary, to formulate public policy, to strike the appropriate balance between competing
interests, and to devise standards for implementation"').
81. See LEXIS-NEXIS v. Beer, 41 F. Supp. 2d 950, 960 (D. Minn. 1999) (granting
injunction prohibiting disclosure of plaintiff's customer information for six months; however,
the salesman could still work for his new employer); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am.
Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 430 (Del. Ch. 1964) (granting preliminary injunction
against former employee taking new position with competitor).
82. See Solutec Corp. v. Agnew, 88 Wash. App. 1067 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (enjoining
employment with competitor for six years).
83. See Earthweb v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating "New
York's strong public policy against [implied-in-factrestrictive covenants which circumvent] the
strict judicial scrutiny they have traditionally required").
84. See Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 501,506 (Ga. 1998) (enjoining the
employee for five years because the court held that the "trade secret is entitled to protection until
the trade secret holder's competitors are able to duplicate the system by legitimate, independent
research").
85. See Aetna Ret. Serv., Inc. v. Hug, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1781, at *28-30 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 18, 1997) (upholding noncompetition agreement based upon principles of
inevitable disclosure).
86. SeeEarthweb,71 F. Supp. 2d at3l0 (declaring "overt theft oftrade secrets.. has long
been recognized as an appropriate ground for enjoining the disclosure of trade secrets").
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The injunctive relief is ultimately based upon the judge's discretion regarding
the particular case.
As illustrated in these representative cases, courts do not apply a consistent
standard when invoking the doctrine of inevitable disclosure. If South Carolina
courts adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine, they will be faced with the
difficult decision of how to apply the doctrine, including not only when to
apply it, but how to develop a framework for crafting a remedy as well.
3. PublicPolicy Considerations
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure directly conflicts with the personal
freedom of employment, as the California decisions rejecting inevitable
disclosure noted.87 However, using principles of commercial morality, most
other courts have been inclined to protect trade secrets over an employee's
freedom to work for a direct competitor.8 Employers invest considerable
money, time, and resources in developing a competitive advantage, and they
demand trade secret protection to maintain that advantage.89 Ensuring
protection of trade secrets promotes technical and business innovation only if
employers know the work will be protected under law.9° Because an employer
must entrust employees with trade secrets in order for those secrets to be
utilized and further developed, businesses have a vested interest in ensuring
that those secrets do not leave with the employee. 1
When deciding what knowledge should limit an employee's freedom of
employment, the courts must perform a fine balancing act between the interests
of the individual and the interests of the former company. "The right of an
individual to follow and pursue the particular occupation for which he is best
trained is a most fundamental right."' Although an employee cannot "take with
him confidential, particularized plans or processes developedby his employer,"

87. See supra note 36.
88. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645,
652-53 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (considering commercial morality and freedom of employment when
deciding to utilize the doctrine of inevitable disclosure).
89. See supra note 7; see also UNIFORM Acr § I n.1, 14 U.L.A. 443 (1990) (stating the
"[p]urpose of Trade Secrets Act is to prevent one person or business from profiting from a trade
secret developed by another, because it would thus be acquiring free competitive advantage").
90. See Allis-Chalmers Mf.Co., 255 F. Supp. at 653 (stating trade secret law seeks "to
protect the owner ofinformation obtained through the ingenuity and efforts ofits employees, and
its expenditures of time and money").
91. See Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (stating that a
company suffers "irreperable harm where a trade secret has been misappropriated").
92. Carolina Chem. Equip. v. Muckenfuss, 322 S.C. 289, 294, 471 S.E.2d 721, 724 (CL
App. 1996); see also AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987); Millard
Maint. Serv. Co. v. Bernero, 566 N.E.2d 379,383 (Il. App. Ct. 1990) (recognizing fundamental
right of individual to pursue a particular occupation for which she is trained).
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he should be "free to take with him general skills and knowledge acquired
during his tenure with his former employer."'93
South Carolina employees who know, or reasonably should have known,
of their former employer's trade secrets have "a duty to refrain from using or
' The duty
disclosing the trade secrets without the employer's permission."94
applies "independently of and in addition to any [other agreements]." 95
Although "[r]estraints cannot be lightly placed upon [a person's] right to
compete in the area of his greatest worth,"'96 a breach of the duty to restrain
from disclosing trade secrets and the resulting irreparable harm imposed on the
employer97 justifies such restraint. The doctrine of inevitable disclosure is the
best tool for balancing the parties' interests when restraining freedom of
employment and protecting trade secrets.
B. South Carolina Courts Should Adopt an Objective Inevitable
Disclosure Test
A former employer seeking to protect its trade secrets should be required
to prove that: (1) the employee possesses trade secrets of the plaintiff, (2) the
new employer is a direct competitor, and (3) it would be impossible for the
employee to perform her duties without revealing the trade secrets. If such a
situation exists, the judge should grant an injunction. The importance of the
trade secret and the responsibilities of the position should govern, within the
judge's discretion, the duration and scope of the injunctive relief. Section 1
below discusses the three proposed elements required for an injunction.
Because crafting the remedy is separate from the three part objective test,
section 2 discusses considerations a judge might weigh when deciding the
parameters of the injunction.
1. FindingInevitable Disclosureof Trade Secrets
a. Possession of Trade Secrets
A plaintiff first must demonstrate that trade secrets exist and that the
employee possesses them.9" The court should apply the statutory language as

93. AMP, 823 F.2d at 1202.
94. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-30(B) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999).

95. Id.
96. See CarolinaChem. Equip., 322 S.C. at 295, 471 S.E.2d at 724.
97. See Merck & Co., 941 F. Supp. at 1455.

98. All inevitable disclosure cases require the plaintiff to prove the employee possesses
trade secrets. See supra notes 35-38. The inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff proves the
existence oftrade secrets. See supra notes 35-3 8; see also Carboline Co. v. Lebeck, 990 F. Supp.
762 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (denying injunctive relief to plaintiff because plaintiff failed to prove
information consisted of trade secrets).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol52/iss4/7
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to what types of information are recognized as trade secrets." When deciding
whether or not a trade secret exists, the court must also consider the
sophistication of the industry, the economic value of the trade secret to the
employer, and the precautions taken by the employer to protect the trade
secret.'O* Standard trade secret exceptions should apply, such as whether the
information has been "disclosed or discovered by proper means."'0 ' The court
should afford equal protection to all categories of trade secrets, but protection
may be varied with respect to the particular industry and the importance of the
trade secret's contents.
Proof that the employee knows, or has reason to know, of an employer's
trade secrets is also mandatory."0 2 An employer cannot restrict an employee
who simply learns the skills of a trade while on the job. 3 The employer must
show that the employee developed, utilized, or possessed the trade secrets."'
b.

CompetitionBetween Employers

The second factor the plaintiff must prove is that the new employer is a
direct competitor.'0 s Proof of direct competition requires more than a showing
that the former and future employers operate in the same "industry," as that
term is broadly defined in some statutes.'o The plaintiff must prove the trade

99. See S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-20(5) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999); see also Carolina
Chem. Equip. v. Muckenfiss, 322 S.C. 289,295-96,471 S.E.2d 721, 724-25 (Ct. App. 1996).
100. See Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1197,
1218 (Utah 1998) (enjoining employee for only nine months while stating, "[t]his is a fluid
industry, with new developments coming at light speed"); Carboline,990 F. Supp. at 767 (ruling
against plaintiff who "did not present convincing evidence that it took measures to maintain the
secrecy ofits documents"); Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 501,505 (Ga. 1998)
(finding plaintiff "took reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of its [trade secrets]").
101. See S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-30(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999).
102. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-30(B) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999).
103. See Carolina Chem. Equip., 322 S.C. at 294,471 S.E.2d at 724.
104. See Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (enjoining
employee who was "privy to []top secret... information. He [could not] eradicate [those] trade
secrets... from his mind"); cf Earthweb v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299,316 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(drawing "a distinction between pursuing 'a general conceptual goal by incorporating specific
needs and wants in the form of instructions for a programmer' and the nuts and bolts of actually
designing the software and hardware architecture;" because employee did former, he was not
enjoined from new employment).
105. All inevitable disclosure cases require the plaintiff to prove the employee is leaving
to work for a competitor. See supra notes 35-38; see, e.g., Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co.,
501 S.E.2d 501,502 (Ga. 1998) (finding employers to be direct competitors).
106. See S.C. CODEANN. § 4-29-10(6) (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1999) ("'Industry' shall
mean anypersonfirm or corporationengagedin any one ormore ofthe enterprisesidentified
in item (3) of this section or any person, firm or corporation providing facilities constituting a
project to be used by any one or more of the enterprises identified in item (3) of this section."
(emphasis added)). S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-29-10(3) provides a very broad definition of "project."
Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-3-10(4) (Law. Co-op. 1986) ("'Industry' shall mean any
person, firm or corporation operating any enterprise or facility for the manufacturing,
processing,assembling,distributingor shipping of any type ofproduct, from which operation,
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secret is directly applicable to 10a 7particular product line or service in which the
new employer also competes.
c. Inevitable Disclosure
The plaintiff's third burden of proof is that the employee would inevitably
disclose the trade secret during her job performance.' 8 A showing that
disclosure would be inevitable is imperative because an employee could work
for a competitor ofher former employer without disclosing trade secrets.'" The
judge should take an objective look at the situation by comparing the trade
secrets involved with the responsibilities inherent in the new position."' The
investigation would not be limited to functionally equivalent positions, but to
any position where the employee would be inclined to utilize the trade secret
in the course of her job performance."' The court should inquire into the
activities involved in the particular position."' Therefore, a plaintiff must
objectively demonstrate that an employee would inevitably reveal the trade
secret while performing in her particular capacity, regardless ofthe employee's
intent." 3 If an employer shows that the employee possesses trade secrets that
she would inevitably disclose to a competitor, the former employer should be
entitled to injunctive relief."'

conditions result which would ... bring about the pollution of the atmosphere or which would
create water pollution problems." (emphasis added)).
107. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645,
646-47 (E.D. Mich. 1966); Essex Group, Inc., 501 S.E.2d at 502; T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v.
Hennessey Motorsports, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 18, 24 (Tex. App. 1998).
108. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir. 1995); Merck & Co. v.
Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1461 (M.D.N.C. 1996), Allis-Chalmers,255 F. Supp. at 654.
109. See T-N-TMolorsporls, 965 S.W.2d at 26.
110. See Allis-Chalmers,255 F. Supp. at 654 (stating "[t]he virtual impossibility of (the
employee] performing all of his prospective duties for [his new employer] to the best of his
ability, without in effect giving it the benefit of [plaintiff's] confidential information, makes a
simple injunction against disclosure and use of this information inadequate").
111. Id. The Allis-Chalmers court found "the nature of the... work done by [the former
employee] on distributor type fueling pumps at [the former employer, and] the nature of the type
of work [the former employee] is to perform at [his new employer] which includes design and
development of distributor type fuel injection pumps, [leads] to an inference that there is an
inevitable and imminent danger of disclosure of [the former employer's] trade secrets." Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see also Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(enjoining employee regardless of his assurance "that he did not want to receive or discuss any
[of plaintiffs] trade secrets").
114. See generallyNat'l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A,2d 31, 33
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) ("[D]amages will not be an adequate remedy when the
competitor has obtained the secrets. The cat is out of the bag and there is no way of knowing to
what extent their use has caused damage or loss.").
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2. Craftingan AppropriateRemedy
The injunctive relief will be discretionary but should depend primarily
upon the trade secrets being protected and the employee's new responsibilities.
The employee should only be enjoined from positions that the former employer
proves will lead to inevitable disclosure ofthe trade secrets. s This will allow
the employee to work for the new employer in a different capacity during the
injunction, or for a different employer altogether. Because the disclosure must
be inevitable for injunctive relief to be considered, the presumption should be
to enjoin employment for six months to a year. The majority of injunctions
against employment are for a year or less." 6 This duration minimizes the
inconvenience to the employee while providing adequate protection to the
employer's trade secret." 17 However, some situations justify longer periods of
restricted employment."' In circumstances where the judge decides enjoining
employment is undeserved, the injunctive relief should at least impose a duty
not to disclose the trade secrets." 9 The employee's statutory duty to keep trade
secrets confidential would justify the injunction.2 Even when enjoining
employment,
a judge should also grant an order to not reveal the trade
2
secrets.1 '
The duration of the injunction should depend upon the anticipated life of
the trade secret as proven by the plaintiff. A trade secret exists only for as long

115. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645,654
(E.D. Mich. 1966) (preventing employee from working with new employer only on projects
relating to the design and development of distributor type fuel injection pumps).
116. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995) (enjoining former
employee for six months); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1464 (M.D.N.C. 1996)
(enjoining employee for one year).
117. See Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1197,
1218 (Utah 1998) (balancing plaintiff's product introduction schedule with defendant's freedom
of employment).
118. See Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 501,506 (Ga. 1998) (restricting
employment in a particular department of the new employer for five years because of the time
and expense of creating plaintiff's logistics system); Solutec Corp. v. Agnew, 88 Wash. App.
1067 (1997) (restricting any competition against former employer in the manufacture of edible
apple waxes containing a particular ingredient for six years even though the employees could
use waxes that were not trade secrets because enforcing an injunction allowing the employees
to use other waxes "would be extremely difficult to police, and would be undulyburdensome and
expensive, in order to determine whether [plaintiffs] trade secrets were used").
119. See APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852, 867 (N.D. Iowa 1997)
(finding plaintiff with whom the employee had signed a non-compete agreement would not be
irreparably harmed by employee's new job because his job was in a different capacity). Courts
typically support this remedy by finding lack of inevitable disclosure. See, e.g., LEXIS-NEXIS
v. Beer, 41 F. Supp. 2d 950, 959 (D. Minn. 1999) (granting only an order not to disclose trade
secrets because plaintiff failed to show employee would inevitably disclose trade secrets).
120. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-30(B) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999).
121. See PepsiCo,Inc., 54 F.3d at 1272 (granting order not to work for competitor for one
year and order not to ever disclose trade secrets).
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as the employer derives commercial advantage from it.'" The period depends
upon the importance of the information composing the trade secret and the
speed of innovation of the industry competitors." The possibility of
terminating the injunction prematurely ifthe new employer can obtain the trade
secret through legitimate means should always be included. An injunction
restricting employment should be accompanied by a prohibition oftrade secret
disclosure for a longer period than employment was enjoined, so that if the
trade secret had not been discovered before the employee returned, the
obligation to keep the trade secret confidential would continue.a" Geographical
restrictions may be irrelevant since the disclosure of trade secrets pertains only26
to certain positions with particular companies, independent of location.
Compensation may be provided for in very limited situations when an
injunction against employment is granted. 27
3.

Comparisonof Test to Other Jurisdictions'Approaches

The proposed test outlined above combines the approaches used in Texas,
Michigan, New York, and Georgia. It diverges from the approaches that

122. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-50(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999); UNIFoRM ACT
§ 2(a) supranote 38.
123. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-50(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999); see also
DoubleClick Inc. v. Henderson, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 577, *23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 5, 1997)
(rejecting plaintiffs request for a one-year injunction and granting a six-month injunction
because "[g]iven the speed with which the Internet advertising industry apparently changes,
defendant's knowledge ofDoubleClick's operations will likely lose value to such a degree that
the purpose of a preliminary injunction will have evaporated before the year is up"); Novell Inc.
v.Timpanogos Research Group Inc, 46 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1197, 1218 (Utah 1998) (stating
"[t]he delay ofonly several months or a year may consign a project to second or third class status
"when enjoining employee for nine months). See generally E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428,436 (Del. Ch. 1964) (stating "courts are nonetheless
entitled to decide or 'predict' the likely consequences arising from a given set of facts and to
grant legal remedies on that basis").
124. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-50(A) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999); see also Essex
Group,Inc., 501 S.E.2d at 506 (stating "'an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret
has ceased to exist"' because "a trade secret is entitled to protection until the trade secret
holder's competitors are able to duplicate the system by legitimate, independent research").
125. See supranote 119.
126. See generally Bus. Intelligence Servs., Inc. v. Hudson, 580 F. Supp. 1068, 1073
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding "the world-wide scope ofthe noncompetition clause not unreasonable,
given the international nature of BIS's business"). The injunction should be sought in the
jurisdiction the competitor is subject to personal jurisdiction. See Merck & Co., 941 F. Supp. at
1447 (filing suit in North Carolina where the new employer had its principle place of business,
even though plaintiffs former employee was a Canadian citizen and had taken a new position
in the United Kingdom).
127. See Aetna Ret. Servs., Inc. v. Hug, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1781, *31 (Conn.
Super. CL June 18, 1997) (ordering plaintiff to pay employee during the injunction the pro rata
portion of his salary in accordance with the non-compete agreement the executive had signed
with his former employer).
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emphasize the parties' activities surrounding the employee's departure.' The
proposed test is heavily modeled after the inquiry conducted by Texas in T-N-T
Motorsports.'29 The Texas Court of Appeals simply inquired whether the
employee possessed trade secrets of his former employer and if he would use
those secrets to compete against his former employer. 3 The court in T-N-T
Motorsports actually held that the employee could work for the competitor
without using the trade secrets, so the court only granted an injunction against
disclosure.' New York articulated a similar test in Earthweb when it focused
on the value of the trade secrets, the level of competition between the
employers, and the ability of the employee to fulfill her newjob responsibilities
without using the trade secrets.' Michigan and Georgia also apply analogous
tests inAllis-Chalmersand Essex respectively."' These courts placed minimal
importance on the employers' and the employees' activities during the job
transition which distinguishes those cases from the leading inevitable disclosure
cases of PepsiCo and Merck.'3
The court in PepsiCo discussed at length the candor of the employee and
the employee's willingness to use his former employer's trade secrets in his
new position. 35 Likewise, one of the factors in Merck was an inquiry into the
"circumstances surrounding the termination."' 36 Although these details of a

case may indicate an employee is more likely to disclose the trade secrets,
inevitable disclosure can be sufficiently proven without those facts. 137 In some
cases the court will actually laud the integrity of the employee while enjoining
her from employment. 3 Therefore, the facts surrounding an employee's

128. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995) (focusing on the facts
surrounding the defendant's departure from the plaintiff's employment).
129. 965 S.W.2d 18, 24 (Tex. App. 1998).
130. Id.
131. Id. at26.
132. Earthweb v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (declining to grant
injunction in the absence of recognized "trade secrets or tortious conduct on the part of the
employee"). The proposed test simply looks for the existence of trade secrets and the employee's
possession of them, while using the value of the trade secret as one consideration when crafting
the remedy. See Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Co., 501 S.E.2d 501,506 (Ga. 1998) (granting
a relatively long injunction offive years because of the time and money the former employer had
invested in the trade secrets involved).
133. See supraParts III.A.2.b, III.A.2.e.
134. See supra Parts III.A.2.a, III.A.2.f.
135. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270.
136. Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1461 (granting an injunction, in part because if an employee
"would misrepresent the truth in order to gain more money through a severance package, he
might also find that the temptation to succeed in his career would be too much for him to ignore
the confidential information he has about plaintiff's operations").
137. See Essex Group, Inc., 501 S.E.2d at 505; E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am.
Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428,436 (Del. Ch. 1964).
138. See Aetna Ret. Servs., Inc. v. Hug, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1781, *28 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 18,1997) ("Itis unquestionable that [the employee] is a person of unimpeachable
integrity whose honesty is widely respected and admired."); see also Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith,
919 F. Supp. 624, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (enjoining employee for six months even though the
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termination, which may be enlightening and important in claims of actual
misappropriation, are essentially irrelevant.
By proving that the former employee possesses trade secrets which she
must reveal in her new job with a competitor, an employer may be able to
enjoin such an individual from that position. The extent of injunctive relief will
ultimately depend upon the judge's discretion when weighing the trade secrets'
importance and the ability of the employee to earn a living.'39
4. Benefits ofthis Objective Test
An objective test furthers public policy supporting the protection of trade
secrets because employers will continue to feel that their innovations are secure
if they take adequate measures to protect them.140Such assurance will promote
increased development and innovation which will indirectly lead to an overall
increase in employment opportunities. This, in turn, promotes freedom of
employment.' 4' The improved job market for everyone may overcome or
balance the restrictions that may be placed on a limited number of employees
seeking limited positions. The proposed test provides a well-balanced approach
to the reconciliation of protecting employers' trade secrets and individuals'
freedom ofemployment. 42 The number of professional opportunities that will
be limited is minimized because the former employer has the entire burden of
proof to show actual or threatened misappropriation which would apply only
to particular positions and employers. 43 The restrictions on an employee's
freedom of employment are likely rare since the injunction should apply only
to particular competitors or products and to specialized positions. An employee

court found him "candid" and measures taken by him and his employer to prevent disclosure of
trade secrets were "admirable").
139. See Nat'l Starch& Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31,32 (N.J. Super.
Ct App. Div. 1987) (stating the "delicate balance of equities" governs the granting of a
preliminary injunction).
140. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 653
(E.D. Mich. 1966) ("[T]he courts seek to enforce increasingly high standards of fairness or
commercial morality and to protect the owner of information obtained through the ingenuity and
efforts of its employees, and its expenditure of time and money."); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941
F. Supp. 1443, 1462 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (explaining the public interest "in encouraging research
and development to provide consumers with competitive, quality products by protecting trade
secret information"). For more discussion on adequate measures to protect trade secrets, see
supranote 8 and accompanying text.
141. See supranote 7. The plaintiff company's investment of millions of dollars and years
of testing, which were protected by trade secret law, gave rise to employment opportunities for
the defendant and others; without such protection, such opportunities may never have been
realized.
142. See generally Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 255 F. Supp. at 652-53 (discussing the
"apparently conflicting principles of law").
143. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262,1266 (7th Cir. 1995) (focusing analysis
on competition with the new employer and the former employee's position with the new
employer).
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knowledgeable of trade secrets will most likely be skilled in the relevant art,
and whether she is a scientist, engineer, or manager, her skills can be utilized
in capacities outside the scope of the particular trade secret.'" Therefore, the
injunctive relief available under the proposed test will not make the employee's
professional skills obsolete nor unjustly limit her career opportunities.
The test also minimizes the fact-based inquiry undertaken by many of the
other jurisdictions.'" An objective test for deciding when to grant an injunction
is preferable because it will result in more consistent holdings, can be applied
by employers, employees, and attorneys with more confidence, and will
eliminate the investigation of the facts surrounding the employee's departure.
The inquiries used by other jurisdictions are inherently subjective as they
speculate as to what the particular employee might do.'" The crafting of the
remedy portion of the proposed test does involve minimal subjective inquiries,
but the granting of an injunction requires a "delicate balance of quities.' 47
When disputes arise, the structured test will encourage settlement because
the parties will be able to better predict the outcome and negotiate accordingly.
The current uncertainty surrounding South Carolina's approach to enjoining
threatened misappropriation, while not yet leading to appellate level litigation,
can lead to agreements which are not the most efficient compromise of trade
secret protection and freedom of employment.
Another possible advantage of the proposed test is that court involvement
after the granting of injunctive relief is likely minimal as subsequent litigation
for actual misappropriation would be available to the former employer.' 4 The
most likely scenario would occur when a former employer brings a claim
because the employee violated the injunction either by working for the
competitor or disclosing the trade secrets. The new employer's primary defense
would then be an independent discovery of the trade secrets, thereby
eliminating the effectiveness of the injunctive relief.'49 Therefore, the
recommended test and remedies minimize judicial oversight.

144. See Allis-ChalmersMfg. Co., 255 F. Supp. at 654 (granting an injunction "to protect
the [trade] secrets without undue restraint on [the employee's] right to pursue his chosen
vocation [by allowing the employee] to work [for the new employer] in application engineering
without limitation as to the field ofactivity, and to engage in design and development in all kinds
of fuel injection systems and pumps except a distributor type pump").
145. See PepsiCo, Inc., 54 F.3d at 1269-72; Merck &Co., 941 F. Supp. at 1460-62.
146. PepsiCo,Inc., 54 F.3d at 1270.
147. Nat'l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31, 32 (N.J. Super. CL
App. Div. 1987).
148. See generallySolutec Corp. v. Agnew, 88 Wash. App. 1067, 1079 (1997) (declaring
a narrow injunction allowing the former employees "to make competitive apple waxes would be
extremely difficult to police," therefore, the court enjoined the employees from the manufacture
of edible apple waxes containing a particular ingredient for a period of six years).
149. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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By not requiring restrictive covenants, it appears that the test removes
incentives for employers to create prior agreements with employees.5 This is
not the case. The test simply provides an additional, though less advantageous,
remedy to employers. Employers are still encouraged to utilize restrictive
covenants. Such agreements would clarify any uncertainty regarding the
employee's obligations and would likely preclude the need to invoke relief
under the Trade Secrets Act."' Employers must draft reasonable and
enforceable restrictive covenants, and they should allow for judicial
modification in the event that the agreement should be supplemented by the
inevitable disclosure doctrine." 2 It is in a company's best interest to impose the
most effective restrictive covenant agreements so the company may avoid the
expense and uncertainty of litigation and so that each party will better
understand permissible post-employment activities.
Finally, courts shouldbe very careful in applying the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure because "its application is fraught with hazards."' 54 Liberal
application of this approach can lead to an "imperceptible shift in bargaining
power" between the employer and employee.' The threat of litigation against
a departing employee "can be a powerful weapon in the hands of an
employer." ' 6 Therefore, this weapon should be eliminated by adhering to all
the elements of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure and limiting the remedy to
only the extent necessary to protect the trade secret.
5.

Summary ofProposedTest

If South Carolina courts adopt the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, the
objective test proposed in this Comment should be considered. The test requires
the plaintiff to prove: (1) trade secrets exist which the employee possesses, (2)

150. Some courts consider the failure of an employer to seek a non-compete agreement
from the employee an indication "that the type of confidential information which [the employee]
possesses has a limited value."Merck & Co., 941 F. Supp. at 1461. Therefore employers should
always obtain areasonable non-compete agreement from employees with knowledge ofvaluable
trade secrets because the lack of such an agreement "weighs heavily against entering an
injunction which would prohibit [the employee] fromobtaining employmentwith a competitor."
Id.
151. See Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (stating "[t]he absence of specific guideposts
[provided by an express non-compete agreement] will only spawn such litigation").
152. See Blackburn, supra note 24, at 21; see also Sheinfeld and Chow, supra note 4, at
399-402, 430-38 (advising companies on how to maximize trade secret protection). But see
Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (invalidating the non-compete agreement because of its broad
restrictions and declining to supplement the agreement with the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure).
153. See Earthweb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 311 ("Clearly, a written agreement that contains a
non-compete clause is the best way of promoting predictability during the employment
relationship and afterwards.").
154. Id. at310.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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the new employer is a direct competitor, and (3) the employee could not
possibly perform her duties without revealing the trade secrets. Proof of this
irreparable harm will justify the enjoining of future employment or disclosure
of trade secrets. The scope and duration of the injunctive relief will depend
upon the judge's discretion regarding the length of trade secret protection and
the value of the trade secret to the former employer. Adopting a relatively
structured and objective test as advocated will enable courts to decide cases
consistently, allow disputes to be settled more easily, and clarify what activities
are acceptable for employees knowledgeable of trade secrets.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the appropriate case does arise, South Carolina courts must quickly
decide whether, and to what extent, injunctive relief should be granted for
inevitable trade secret misappropriation. South Carolina has the statutory
provision to allow injunctive relief for actual or threatened misappropriation
and does not have the statutory ban on freedom of contract and employment
which can be used to defeat the inevitable disclosure doctrine. When the time
comes, South Carolina courts should adopt the doctrine of inevitable disclosure
and apply an objective test that balances the protection of trade secrets with the
freedom of employment.
Keith A. Roberson
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